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“With Juan Facundo Quiroga came the ultimate triumph of the provinces over the cities,
and with the spirit, government, and civilization of the cities dominated came the final formation
of the central, unitarist, despotic government of Juan Manuel Rosas, who sticks the gaucho’s knife
into cultured Buenos Aires and destroys the work of centuries: civilization, law, and liberty.”1
Such were the sentiments of Domingo F. Sarmiento when, in 1845, he published Facundo:
Civilizacion y Barbarie – his account and critique of the regimes of Facundo Quiroga and Rosas.
Sarmiento’s account of the time were plagued by his ideological trappings. In choosing his words
to describe the two opposing worldviews prevalent in the struggle for power in Argentina, he
revealed his leanings. Civilization and barbarism left no doubt as to how he viewed Caudillismo2
and its struggle with the “civilized” Buenos Aires. Nevertheless, his accounts provide an
interesting view into the world of the caudillo.3 The caudillos employed authoritarian power
structures – namely clientelism based upon kinship, land, and military authority – to rule over their
respective provinces and, in the case of Rosas, of Argentina as a whole. In the eyes of Sarmiento,
these caudillos spelled the end of civilization in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and beyond. Caudillismo
reinforced the traditional economy and social hierarchies that prevented Argentina from meeting
the expectations set for it by optimistic liberals such as Sarmiento, who had hoped for Argentina
to depart from the traditional models promoted by Caudillismo and join what they saw as the
modernity of Western European models.

1

Domingo F. Sarmiento, Facundo: Civilizacion y Barbarie, ed. Raimundo Lazo (Mexico: Editorial Porrúa, S.A., 1969
(1845)), 34.
2
Socio-political system with a caudillo at its center.
3
Term most commonly applied to militarist leaders in Latin America.
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Origins of the Caudillo and its Place in the
Context of Nineteenth-Century Latin America
Following the revolution, we had to look around us, searching for what could fill the
void that the inquisition, the defeated absolute power, had left behind – D.F. Sarmiento4

In the context of nineteenth-century Latin America, the caudillo had come to represent a
very specific presence in the political landscape. The term originated during the Reconquista in
Spain, associated with such rulers as Pelagius – founder of the Kingdom of Asturias in 718 CE –
who is credited with beginning the liberation of the Iberian Peninsula from its Moorish rulers.
Simply, it derives from the diminutive Latin capitellum meaning “head.”
In Spanish America it continued to be used and evolved in meaning. Prior to the revolutions
against Spain in the early nineteenth century, Spanish colonial policy promoted the existence of
militia forces to supplement the smaller contingents of professional soldiers in the colonies. This
allowed the colonies to more easily protect themselves not only from external forces but also
internal ones. The practice of allowing regional landowners in Argentina, known colloquially as
estancieros,5 to maintain militias for provincial security continued into the era of the early
Argentine state.6
During the post-independence period in Spanish America, as in Spain before it, the caudillo
began as the military leader, a person who led militias during the turbulent revolutionary period
and formation of nascent states. Where the caudillo of nineteenth-century Latin America differed
from the caudillo in Spain, was in the power structured around the former as a means of control.
Caudillos employed extensive patron-client networks to consolidate power around them and to
ensure their dominance in their region, or in the case of caudillos like Rosas, as head of a state.
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Domingo F. Sarmiento, Recuerdos de Provincia (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sopena, 1966 (1850)), 92.
Landed elites, owners of large estates called estancias.
6
John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America 1800-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 132-133.
5
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While similar power structures had existed in medieval Europe, where the term was first coined,
the caudillo of old was not defined by them.
The story of the Latin American caudillo began with the dawn of statehood. The colonial
apparatus of the Spanish-controlled viceroyalties had been designed to keep power in the hands of
the crown authority and its representatives in the New World. In the lead up to independence, the
Spanish crown sought to reinforce its already tight-fisted approach to ruling the colonies. The
Bourbon Reforms sought to keep the colonies in line and removed what limited power their
inhabitants had gained. Chief among these policies was the removal of criollos,7 those of direct
Spanish descent born in the Americas, from important local bureaucratic positions. In their place
peninsulares,8 those colonists born in Spain, were appointed. In 1807, just a few years before
sustained rebellion against Spanish rule in the colonies – Argentina fighting for its independence
between 1810 and 1818 – only twelve of the ninety-nine judges of the colonial audencias9 were
criollo.10 The colonial administration was helmed by bureaucracy, without the personalism
important to patronage. Governance was relatively well institutionalized, albeit in the form of a
largely disliked colonial system.11
Not only did this exacerbate tensions between the colonial elites and their Iberian
counterparts, but it also enforced the inferior positioning of the criollos in the power structures of
colonial Latin America. However, the Bourbon Reforms also included the establishment of a far
more organized military than had ever previously existed in the colonies. Initially, the leadership
roles of this reformed military were filled by peninsulares, deployed straight from Spain. Over

7

Social class in the Spanish colonial caste system, people of direct Spanish descent born in the colonies.
Principal social class in the Spanish colonial caste system, Spanish-born people residing in the colonies
9
High courts of justice in the Spanish colonial system.
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E. Bradford Burns and Julie A. Charlip, Latin America: An Interpretive History (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc.,
2007),
11
John Lynch, Latin America between Colony and Nation (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 164.
8

Bos 4

time, however, this particular institution was not as insular as the bureaucracy that controlled the
political and economic life of the colonies. The colonial militias proved to be a source of power
and prestige for the criollos that had recently found themselves pushed out of other institutions of
power.12 Climbing the ranks of the colonial militias would prove important both in the fight for
independence from Spain and in the path to power that many caudillos would take, even after the
start of the Wars of Independence.
War had been the chief priority of the new states that carved their destinies out of Latin
America. Where the state lacked political institutions to enforce its will, military power developed
in the fight against Spain to fill this need. The military existed as the most easily employed force
at a time when the state lacked the financial resources and ability to project authority to the
periphery. The caudillo of Latin America was a byproduct of the war for independence. As the
colonial apparatus was disrupted and its institutions were destroyed, social groups were open to
compete with one another for power.13 The caudillos of the estancias were poised particularly well
in this competition, with access to land, wealth, and their peonaje.14 As such, the political and
military clout of the caudillo militia leaders like Rosas greatly expanded.15
Perhaps even more important than the role of the military in relation to the center, which
was established as trend with these developments, was the great importance that military power
began to play in the management of local authority and governance. It is here that the roles of the
regular military and regional militias, and their heads, met. The cosmopolitan and provincial
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José Carlos Chiaramonte, Ciudades, Provincias, Estados: Orígenes de la Nación Argentina (1800-1846) (Buenos
Aires: Compañía Editora Espasa Calpe, 1997), 94-95.
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Lynch, Latin America between Colony and Nation, 165.
14
A group of laborers, in the context of this paper such a group that is tied to an estate and the patron residing
over it.
15
Tulio Halperin-Donghi, The Aftermath of Revolution in Latin America, trans. Josephine de Bunsen (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973), 4.
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interests of the regular army and provincial militias, respectively, existed together and relatively
conflict free, for the time being.
After the war for independence, the new formal and informal institutions created by the
military’s involvement in the affairs of the state persisted. What made Argentina unique, in
contrast to many of the other states in the region, was that it built up its military in line with the
growth of paramilitary power in the provinces. However, this did not save Argentina from the
same phenomena experienced elsewhere in Spanish America. Instead, Argentina’s large military
produced even greater problems. After the war for independence, the state reformed the military
to reduce its size and the financial obligations associated with maintaining such a large force. By
pensioning a large portion of its officers, Argentina avoided financial strain at a time when
monetary resources were extremely tight. Unfortunately for the state, this also created a group of
well-trained ex-soldiers who would not stand for the economic troubles and political indecision
and Unitarian policies ahead.16
In the development of parallel military and political authority, each with centralist,
cosmopolitan and federalist, provincial counterparts, the foundations of Sarmiento’s view on the
struggle between the provinces and cities can be seen. During the Argentine war for independence,
the battles were mostly fought on the frontier. Buenos Aires was largely spared from the warfare.
Thus, Argentina’s caudillos were created on the frontier while the civilian politicians in Buenos
Aires forged ahead in their attempts to create an Argentine state. Rivadavia and other Unitarian
political figures embraced the rhetoric of liberal policies, seeking to selectively expand the rights
of marginalized peoples. In addition, such policies focused on creating institutionalized power as
a means of governance rather than personalistic or militaristic power structures.

16

Ibid., 15.
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In Argentina, Sarmiento saw “two distinct civilizations occupying the same ground.”17 The
culture that Sarmiento saw in the cities, namely Buenos Aires, was defined by the “adherence” of
the new political establishment to liberal and republican ideals, appealing to novel models of
governance and political movements born in Western Europe and the United States. Such ideals
resonated with Sarmiento and the statesmen in Buenos Aires who preceded him. To them, these
ideals represented the notion of progress and the achievements of centuries of civilization. In
contrast, the caudillo represented what Sarmiento saw as antiquated constructions of power. He
described the civilization of the provinces as “nascent, without understanding of that which is
above it” and asserted that it repeats “those ingenious and popular movements of the Middle
Ages.”18 The authoritarianism of the caudillos threatened the progress of civilization and the
freedoms that were afforded by Sarmiento’s vision by imposing upon higher civilization the chaos
of the lower order. The term “barbarism,” as employed in Facundo, did not imply lack of
civilization. In fact, Sarmiento believed that the link between barbarism and tradition gave it some
sense of meaning and link to a lower order of civilization.19 Essentially, Caudillismo was
connected to a past culture, rooted in what Sarmiento believed were antiquated understandings of
society and power. Ultimately, to Sarmiento, history was progress, and this progress had been
interrupted by the barbarism of the caudillos.

17

Domingo F. Sarmiento, Facundo: Civilizacion y Barbarie (Madrid: Editorial Nacional, 1974 (1845)), 105.
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Power and Conflict in the Early Argentine State
La República Argentina es una e indivisible. - in Facundo

Unfortunately for the early Unitarian leaders of Buenos Aires, post-war Argentina was not
a peaceful place. The end of conflict with Spain did not translate to peace and stability for the state.
Struggles between the centralist forces in Buenos Aires and the federalist forces of the provinces
created a large degree of tension. From their newfound positions of power in regional militias, the
caudillos could assert their authority and make their move on the centers of power.
As mentioned in Facundo, in Argentina two worldviews developed alongside one another:
those of “civilization” and “barbarism.” It is important, however, to understand these terms both
in historical context and in relation to Sarmiento’s ideology. While his choice of words may not
be entirely appropriate for discussion on the ideological struggle found in Argentina at the time,
the meaning of his words provides powerful insight. His use of “barbarism” to describe the more
traditional organizations of society found in the Argentine provinces and “civilization” to describe
what he believed to be the enlightened and progressive arrangements of those dwelling in the cities
highlight his ideological worldview. Essentially, what Sarmiento described was the conflict
between those provincial interests that favored the maintenance of regional authority and those
cosmopolitan interests that favored the establishment of centralized authority in their favor.
These two ideological paths more concretely manifested themselves in two separate
political ideologies that, at times, were related to one another but nonetheless competed. Conflict
centered on what form of governance Argentina would pursue, a loose organization of federated
provinces or a centralized state dominated by Buenos Aires.20 Unitarians sought a centralist

20

David Bushnell and Neill MaCaulay, The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994), 119.
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solution. The civil and political porteño21 leaders – with their close commercial, political, and
ideological ties to Europe and the United States – sought a system of government that would
consolidate authority in their hands.22 They possessed a disproportionate share of the wealth and
knowledge of the new state and hoped to use their position to turn Argentina into a state based
upon their idealization of progress. As the portenõs resided in a port town dependent upon
international trade, progress meant the stabilization of the state to facilitate trade in the service of
elite interests.
Meanwhile, Federalism in Argentina drew much of its strength from the resentment by
provincial peoples of the domineering attitude of the porteños. In addition, the independent
tendencies and interests of the caudillos paired well with federalism. Federalists wished to keep
power devolved, recognizing the fragmented nature of provincial interests. Even Buenos Aires
province was divided between the interests of the city proper and the estancieros of the
countryside. However, these estancieros still retained ties to the city and shared many of its
economic interests.23 In Argentina, both Federalism and Unitarianism were set upon the same
course, with the same goal; consolidation of power and the establishment of sovereign entities
from the former Spanish colony. However, the means to achieve such ends were not agreed upon
by representatives of the two systems, and thus they were locked in conflict.
Statesmen such as Bernardino Rivadavia, the first president of the Argentine state, sought
to place executive government squarely within the confines of law and political institutions that
they believed would lead to the stability and sustainability of their respective states. These early
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Residents of the city of Buenos Aires.
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civilian leaders of Argentina believed in government defined by the power of legislation and
institutional power, not in the patronage embraced by the caudillos.24
On 1 February 1820, early conflict between the center and periphery in Argentina
climaxed. In Argentina, the city of Buenos Aires and the central authority residing there
represented the “center.” On the other hand, interests of the rural elites and provinces represented
the periphery. Having lost much of its authority and control over the northern provinces, the
government of Buenos Aires was besieged by caudillos from Entre Rios and Santa Fe provinces.
Francisco Ramírez and Estanislao López defeated the forces of Buenos Aires, occupied the city
and set about destroying all vestiges of the centralist authority they had just routed. The invading
caudillos destroyed the national directorate and congressional buildings. The province of Buenos
Aires was plunged into chaos for the Unitarians and their supporters.25
Stumbling away from defeat, the Unitarian government looked for help to the south. Many
of the estancieros of southern Buenos Aires province answered the call to come to the aid of the
city, bringing with them their militias. Leading these estancieros was Juan Manuel de Rosas. Rosas
spent September of 1820 preparing the gaucho26 peons of his estanciero allies. Having formed
them into a militia of 500 men, he marched them to join the armies of Buenos Aires and its allies.
Rosas responded to the calls made by Buenos Aires “with increasing insistence.”27 Rosas used his
position as superior among his fellow estancieros and military forces to defeat or outmaneuver his
rival caudillos, Ramírez and López. Having restored the calm to Buenos Aires, Rosas deployed
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his colorados28 in the streets of the capital. However, this new found peace did not spell the end
of the troubles for the Unitarian government on whose behalf Rosas had intervened.
Although he had come to the rescue of the Unitarian national government and defended
the administration of Martín Rodríguez, Rosas was no friend of the city of Buenos Aires.
According to Colonel Aráoz de La Madrid, a leading officer in the national military, the urban
elites paid dearly for the intervention of the “bloodthirsty gaucho Rosas.” According to de la
Madrid, Rosas used excessive force in managing Buenos Aires. Displaying his shared sympathies
with the civilian statesmen, de la Madrid recalled that Rosas “took pleasure in oppressing the
enlightened classes with the men of the countryside.”29
During this period, Rosas evolved from estanciero to caudillo. As reward for his service
to Buenos Aires, Rosas acquired greater landholdings – expanding his peonage and therefore the
forces from which he could draw to maintain his colorados militia. All of this was essential to the
construction of the caudillo. In addition to more land and military power, Rosas earned a place in
the political landscape of Argentina. His position, both politically and militarily, allowed Rosas to
begin the construction of his patron-client network. Having pushed the provincial caudillos from
Buenos Aires in the defense of the Unitarian government, Rosas engaged in peace talks with
López, the leader of Santa Fe province. However, Rosas’ negotiations came without approval from
Buenos Aires. Using funds from the Rodríguez government, Rosas paid for the maintenance of
López’ militia – buying a valuable ally in the provinces for the future.30
With the end of conflict between the provinces and the center orchestrated by Rosas and
with the aid of other Unitarian leaders – those interested in vesting supreme governmental

28

The name of the militia organized by Juan Manuel de Rosas.
Gregorio Aráoz de La Madrid, Memorias del general Gregorio Aráoz de La Madrid (Buenos Aires, 1968), 1:197.
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Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 86.
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authority to the center – the threat of conflict diminished. In a letter to John, First Viscount
Ponsonby, the British Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary to Argentina, the Argentine minister of
finance, Manuel García, declared that there was no longer a possibility that the “rebel caudillos”
could dismember the center, as they had just done only a few years before. García argued that these
caudillos did “not possess the talents or means to affect such a plan” and that “the purely personal
authority of these chieftains is rapidly becoming a thing of the past.”31 It seemed that from that
moment forth, although Caudillismo was not finished in the provinces, the individual regional
caudillos themselves affected the center less and less. From then on, the personalities of the
provincial caudillos were inferior to their chief in Buenos Aires, and their interests played a
secondary role to those of Rosas. For the immediate future, the power of governance of Buenos
Aires remained in the hands of the civilian and Unitarian government of Rividavia, appointed to
the presidency on 7 February 1826.32
While civilian governance was maintained in Buenos Aires province, the remaining
provinces acted on their own – fighting among themselves for power. However, the provinces were
united, while only briefly, behind the Unitarian government of Rivadavia when conflict broke out
between Brazil and the inhabitants of the Banda Oriental, modern-day Uruguay. To the
Argentines, the Banda Oriental was a part of their cultural brotherhood and a rightful part of the
Rio de la Plata33 region. Argentina rallied its forces and went to the aid of the patriot forces of the
Banda Oriental. War with Brazil precipitated the end of the Rivadavia government and the
beginning of the reign of the caudillos in Argentina.

31

García to Ponsonby, 5 December 1826, cited in Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 86.
Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 87.
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Name of the region surrounding the mouth of the Rio de la Plata between Buenos Aires province and Uruguay,
extending northward toward Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil.
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The maintenance of the military, with the formerly pensioned officers returned to service,
proved to be a massive drain on the treasury of the Argentine state. The elites of Buenos Aires
grew dissatisfied with both the financial situation and alliance with the provinces led by Rivadavia.
This dissatisfaction multiplied when Rivadavia placed the province of Buenos Aires itself under
direct control of the national government, thus curtailing the power of the region’s elites. At the
same time, Rivadavia’s allies in the interior were becoming increasingly unhappy with the center.
The imposition of religious freedom in the country through an agreement with Great Britain made
by Rivadavia was an especially contentious issue. Though Argentina had managed to turn the tide
against Brazil, Emperor Dom Pedro II refused to back down, thus allowing the war to drag on and
leading to stalemate. As a result of the complicated nature of the war with Brazil, Great Britain
mediated peace between all sides and negotiated Uruguayan independence and imposed its will on
Argentina, forcing religious freedom upon the staunchly Catholic state.34
Revolts in the provinces ended the ambitions of Rivadavia, who was forced to step down.
The struggle now resided on one side with his political successors in the Unitarian movement and
on the other with the Federalists who continued the push for greater regional autonomy. The
Unitarians acted swiftly, killing the Federalist governor of Buenos Aires – Manuel Dorrego.35
Dorrego’s execution triggered the galvanization of the Federalist landowners against the
Unitarians – led by their very own caudillo, José María Paz – behind the leadership of various
strongmen. Chief among these were Rosas and Facundo Quiroga, both competing for the title of
leader of the Federalist movement while simultaneously competing against Paz.
Rosas derived substantial power from his dominance in Buenos Aires province and the
political and military arrangements that he had established in his time leading the province. While

34
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Rosas held the superior position to Facundo Quiroga in terms of military power and prestige, it
was not until Facundo suffered two humiliating defeats at the hands of Paz and his superior
Unitarian forces that he showed deference to Rosas and joined his camp. Shortly after, Rosas sent
Estanislao López – the original enemy of the Unitarian movement that Rosas had coopted into his
client network – to confront Paz.
The Federalist army, led into battle by López, convincingly defeated Paz’s forces, bringing
an end to the struggle between Rosas and the Unitarian provinces. Argentina was united under the
Federalist banner of the caudillo Rosas.
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The Argentine Caudillos: Facundo Quiroga and Rosas
The name of Facundo filled the absence of laws;
freedom and the spirit of the city had ceased to exist – in Facundo

Where had the two most formidable Federalist caudillos of the nascent Argentine national
period come from? The traditional trajectory of caudillos involved a privileged birth, often into
the class of the estanciero families. For Rosas, this was very much the case. Facundo Quiroga’s
origin story was more humble.
Facundo Quiroga was born in La Rioja province – where he would rise to prominence and
power and rule as caudillo. Facundo Quiroga came from a family of impoverished ranchers,
lacking the benefits of higher birth that would give him an edge like his future contemporaries.
Despite his family’s economic position, he was fortunate enough to receive the opportunity of an
education. Sent to San Juan in the nearby province of the same name, Facundo Quiroga did not
settle well into school life and made his escape. Facundo Quiroga’s tale began as he wandered the
deserts between San Juan and his home province. There, so the legend goes, he encountered a
cougar, engaged with it in mortal combat and slayed it. For the remainder of his life, Facundo
Quiroga would carry the nickname el tigre de los llanos (“the tiger of the plains”).36
This was Facundo Quiroga’s first claim to his future authority and military power. His
purported skill at such a young age, in dispatching a fierce predator of the Argentine desert, boosted
his reputation and in particular his masculine image. Masculinity was an important aspect in the
construction of the caudillo. While the validity of such a tale is questionable at best, that it was
taken for truth by the people who would serve under Facundo Quiroga and his peers was all that
was necessary. Such purported heroics formed the bedrock of a cult of personality and masculinity

36
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around Facundo Quiroga. Such constructions were incredibly valuable tools in the arsenal of the
caudillo in the building and projecting power.
Following the May Revolution against Spain in 1810, Facundo Quiroga travelled to the
nearby province of San Luis to join the patriot army of José de San Martín. Unfortunately for
Facundo Quiroga, the very same ill temper that he had exhibited as a schoolboy manifested itself
again in his early attempt at military service. As a result, he was imprisoned by his own side and
spent most of the war behind bars, only to be released and sent home to La Rioja. Once home,
Facundo settled into life as a businessman.
It was not until the collapse of centralist authority in Buenos Aires in 1820 that Facundo
Quiroga’s ambitions reasserted themselves, and he sought to gain military power. Facundo
Quiroga entered the provincial army and quickly rose through its ranks, accumulating authority
and prestige. Employing his newfound status, Facundo gained control of the government and
aligned himself with the anti-centralist forces opposed to the government of Rivadavia. 37
At the very same time, Rosas had aligned himself to protect the Rivadavia government.
While born into a wealthy landed criollo family and given an education befitting his family’s
status, Rosas took up a limited role in military service at the age of 13 in the fight against the
British invasion of the Rio de la Plata in 1806. Afterwards, Rosas returned to Buenos Aires
province and accrued fame for his skill as a gaucho, working on his estancia. Rosas expanded his
wealth by increasing his land holdings and investing heavily in cattle ranching and slaughter
houses.38
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Facundo Quiroga represented the social advances made by people outside of the socioeconomic elite during the post-independence period. Socio-economic and political mobility had
expanded with the end of the colonial order but still remained limited. The story of a poor rancher’s
son climbing the social hierarchy to find himself as caudillo of a province was still very much the
exception. Of the eighteen caudillos who ruled the various provinces of Argentina from 1810 to
1870, only three did not belong to a great landed or wealthy family.39 Rosas, on the other hand,
exemplified the typical rise to power of the caudillos – born to a wealthy family and utilizing that
happenstance to his advantage, growing and consolidating his authority. Regardless of birth,
however, each of the caudillos shared a common path: military service. Prestige was most
abundant in a successful military career. However, military capabilities, gained in service to the
state, were far more employable in the consolidation of authority for the caudillos.

39
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Caudillos and Land Reform
Expansion was extensive rather than intensive, for it was land, not capital, which was
abundant, and there was as yet no technical innovation, no attempt to improve stock or
modernize production. The number of cattle and size of estates were all that counted.
– Leslie Bethell40

With respect to general economic policy, the Federalist movement was split into two
regional camps. The provincial caudillos argued for the decentralization of all authority, including
the economic power held in Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, porteño Federalists in Buenos Aires
understood autonomy very differently. To them, it meant retaining the lucrative income made by
the port on import and export tariffs.41 Rosas embraced porteño economic policy, which sought to
expand the power of the capital through economic policy rather than expanding economic
opportunity for the masses, something that provincial caudillos often neglected as well.
Rosas concerned himself most with the expansion and securing of landholdings in
Argentina, especially in Buenos Aires province. Even before assuming power, Rosas and his
followers intervened in government land reform. Starting in 1822, the government of Martín
Rodríguez, seeking to implement policies in the hopes of mimicking European development
models and paying off substantial national debt, organized a system of emphyteusis. This initiative
was spearheaded by Rivadavia who, at the time, was a member of the governing administration,
for government lands in provincial Buenos Aires. A holdover from the colonial period,
emphyteusis was based upon Roman law. Under this system, government lands were organized
for the purpose of being rented to the citizenry. While land was rented out for a period, ownership
remained in the hands of the state. The vast reserves of land at the government’s disposal, now
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integrated into the emphyteusis system, represented a potential boost in productivity and economic
output for the early Argentine economy.
In renting out previously closed lands to the citizenry, the government hoped to empower
some of the lower classes and raise revenues, all the while retaining ownership of the land itself
by limiting the rental period to twenty years.42 The system was far more susceptible to the will of
the landed elites than was foreseen by those reformers who implemented it. The rates for renting
the land were incredibly low. Thus, those already established and wealthy landowners were able
to acquire the most land. All an interested party had to do to claim its plot of land was to simply
measure it. Once the rights to the land were granted, the lessee was then allowed to sell his rights
and subdivide the land as he saw fit.
By 1828, over 6.5 million acres had been granted through the emphyteusis system.
However, this vast amount of land was placed into the hands of a mere 112 individuals, ten of
whom received substantial plots of more than 130,000 acres each. By the 1830s, the amount of
land issued to individuals by the state exceeded 21 million acres and was in the possession of 500
individuals, most of whom were members of the urban elites and allies of Rosas.43 Thanks to the
efforts of the landed elite in consolidating land through the system of emphyteusis, an incredible
amount of land was kept in the hands of only a few, privileged individuals.
Despite such an enormous opening of government lands, the desires of the landed elite
were not satiated. When Rosas assumed the role of governor of Buenos Aires and ended the rule
of the Unitarian civilian government, in 1829, he made it a priority to expand settlement. In 1833,
under the name of suppressing aggression against Argentine settlement by the indigenous peoples
of the region, Rosas launched the Desert Campaign into the southern frontier, reaching as far as
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the Rio Negro. As a result of the Desert Campaign, the land area of the province of Buenos Aires
expanded by several thousands of square miles.44 Buenos Aires now controlled the mouths of the
two largest rivers of the expanded frontier, the Rio Negro and the Rio Colorado.

45

More importantly, Rosas now had new lands under his control with which to reward his
loyal followers. The provincial government, directed by Rosas, began transferring vast sums of
the newly acquired land into the hands of Rosas’ band of loyal compatriots – especially those
military officers who had aided him in the campaign.
In the eyes of its Unitarian architects, the system of emphyteusis, created only in the
previous decade, had proven a failure. It facilitated the exploitation and consolidation of land in
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the hands of wealthy estancieros, the chief allies of Rosas. In return, the state profited little. Rent
on the land in the emphyteusis system was far too low to provide the state the money that it
desperately needed. The expenses incurred during the war against Spain and subsequent struggles,
made by the state to consolidate and fend off challenges from its rivals within the region, saddled
the early Argentine state with onerous debts.
The addition of vast tracts of land to the Argentine state and Rosas’ pro-estanciero political
ideology triggered a reevaluation of the legal structures governing landholdings. Without valuable
returns from the rents collected from this land, Rosas decided to do away with this system. Instead
of maintaining ultimate state ownership of the land, he sold it directly to private landowners.46 Not
coincidentally, the wealthy were the primary benefactors of this new system, and the names of
those who purchased some of the largest plots of land were the very same who had done so under
emphyteusis. Rosas’ wealthiest allies continued their dominance of the land in Buenos Aires,
ensuring the superior position of his power structure. Again, the numbers are revealing. The
process of selling off government lands began in 1836. By 1840, another 21 million acres was sold
off to 293 individuals.47 Nearly the equivalent amount of land rented out during emphyteusis had
been sold to almost half as many landowners. In Rosas’ tenure land had become even more heavily
concentrated than before.
Not all of Rosas’ allies were already established in the landed elite. Some of his most
powerful clients were those officers and members of the soldiery who had supported him during
his military campaigns and in power. In order to reward these supporters, Rosas established
boletos de premios en tierras, land certificates, as reward for military service. While Rosas placed
the lands of the emphyteusis system into the hands of his well-connected allies, he issued some
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8,500 land grants to his military allies.48 The issuance of such grants had a practical purpose, for
the Argentine state did not possess the means to issue proper salaries or pensions for its military.
However, the political element of such a system was the central factor at play. With an economy
that focused heavily on cattle ranching, land was one of the most valuable assets one could possess
in Argentina, and it was abundantly available following the Desert Campaign and end of
emphyteusis. Land was Rosas’ tool. Having the greatest access to it gave him the initiative over
other caudillos and allowed him to both expand and secure his client network. The patronage of
Rosas knew no rival.
All of this did not serve to improve the economic prospects of the average Argentinian.
The socio-economic structures of Argentina were only made more rigid than before by the land
grants and sales orchestrated by Rosas. William MacCann, an English observer traveling through
Argentina, commented that “there is as yet no middle class; the owners of the land feeding
immense flocks and herds form one class, their herdsmen and shepherds another.”49
The land certificates that were issued out by Rosas for military service did not serve as a
means for the socio-economic advancement of many of the soldiery. Instead of holding on to their
newly acquired tracts of land for future potential economic gains, soldiers sold off more than 90%
of their new properties to landed elites.50 Most of those awarded land through the grants could not
afford to develop them into substantial enough plots to make them economically lucrative.
Developing an estancia was a capital-heavy project not suited for those who lacked the financial
resources necessary to do so. As such, many soldiers and citizens who were granted land sold it to
already established landowners. In other cases, displaying the nature of the patron-client networks
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established during the period of caudillo rule in Argentina, the estancieros simply received the
certificates of the soldiers under their patronage as tribute.51
The implications of the pro-estancia policies are astounding. From 1830 to 1852, the land
area that was newly incorporated into Argentina as a result of the Desert Campaign represented a
42% increase in available lands. In addition, relations with those indigenous peoples that had aided
Rosas improved marginally and tensions between settlers and indigenous populations eased as
Argentine settlement dominated the region. The growth of new estancias, however, was lower at
28%. This meant that, while there were more estancias in general, the average size had increased.
The number of proprietors, meanwhile, had only increased by 17% through the period.52
Rosas’ closest political advisor, and the greatest landowner in Buenos Aires, Nicolás
Anchorena, had accumulated astonishing 2,334,146 acres across his estancias. General Angel
Pacheco, one of Rosas’ chief military leaders, had nearly 600,000 acres to his name. Minister of
Foreign Affairs Felipe Arana and the economic adviser Juan Terrero held some 320,000 acres
each.53 In addition to their favored position in the acquisition of territory, these allies of Rosas
were granted “a distinction and privilege” in the form of exemption from state levies on their
peonaje and cattle.54
Expansion of land and the greater concentration of property, especially in the hands of his
allies, was a key trait of Rosas’ regime. Rosas placed himself at the center of an impressive client
network based on the supreme power and wealth found in the estancias held by his followers and
the peonaje that belonged to them. Rosas’ patronage linked deputies, government officials,
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military personnel, and peons all together in varying degrees of relationship to the center of power
that he commanded.

Caudillos, Society, and Economy
Society has disappeared completely, only the feudal family remains,
isolated, concentrated, and having no unified society. – in Facundo

The estancias had come to dominate social and economic life in the provinces. The
supreme authority held by the caudillos and other estancieros in such spaces gave them an
incredible influence in reshaping life in Argentina. However, there existed no encompassing
fundamental changes to the social hierarchy, nor of the individual classes which belonged to it.
During the time of the caudillos, colonial social structures were adapted in order to create revenue
for the developing state. The results were not unique to the time or place. The social classes
resembled their counterparts in the colonial system, save one especially important group.
The gauchos, a staple of early Argentine culture, underwent the greatest amount of change
during this time. This social class, comprised primarily of mestizos – those of mixed Spanish and
indigenous ancestry – was highly traditional and semi-nomadic. The gaucho was a skilled
horseman very familiar with tending to cattle, although not tied to any ranch in particular. Instead,
gauchos roamed the pampas, working or joining military expeditions when they saw fit.
In the ever-changing economy now dominated by the estancias, however, the
independence of the gauchos came under threat. In the hopes of increasing their peonaje and thus
expanding the grand patron-client network, estancieros set about taming the gaucho. Estanciero
interests in the national government established laws curtailing the nomadic tendency of gauchos,
requiring them to carry identity cards and certificates of employment or face forced military
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conscription or hard labor.55 Such punishments persuaded some of the unruly gauchos to accept
existence as a peon on an estancia. They were kept there by labor practices designed to limit their
mobility and freedoms, including the payment of low wages and indebtedness in the forms of credit
owed to the estancia store and the patron.56
Unsurprisingly, Rosas partook in the economic subjugation of his peonaje. Instructions for
the management of his estancias given to their respective overseers prohibited peons from raising
their own livestock or hunting wild game.57 Estancieros enacted this policy because the products
that could be gained from such activities could be sold at market, giving the peon a degree of
independence from the estancia and, more importantly, from the patron himself.
The results of the caudillo-backed expansion of the estancia system affected the native
inhabitants of Argentina. The immediate post-revolutionary period had been a rhetorically positive
experience for the indigenous peoples of Argentina. They were declared to be equal to the criollos
before the law and included in military service. On 12 March 1813, the General Assembly of the
United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata ratified and expanded the decree of 1811 which had called
for the end of Indian serfdom through the encomienda58 system. All of these liberties, and more,
afforded to the indigenous population were enshrined in the 1819 constitution – extending to them
the full civil liberties and equality under the law.59

However, the poor conditions among

indigenous communities in Argentina and their standing in society did not improve. The rhetoric
and actions taken in favor of the revolution’s indigenous policy had focused upon granting
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freedoms but not ensuring the welfare of the indigenous community. Indigenous communities
remained on the periphery of Argentine society and were excluded from the brotherhood of the
nation.
Matters were made worse for the indigenous community by Rosas’ Desert Campaign. The
largest, purest concentrations of Argentina’s indigenous population existed in the sub-Andean
provinces and remote areas of the west. It was in these regions that Rosas focused his military
campaign. Defeated and dispersed at the hands of Rosas, Argentina’s native population was forced
out of their traditional lifestyle, with some joining the national economy as peons for the estancias
that were then expanding into their former homelands. Meanwhile, many more were pushed away
from their traditional homelands, far beyond the reaches of contemporary Argentine settlement.60
Positive rhetoric of the liberalizing revolutionary regime accompanied the slave policies
during the revolution. So that their ports “should not be contaminated by a trade as shameful as it
is reprehensible,” the governing triumvirate issued a pair of decrees, 9 April and 14 May 1812,
prohibiting the slave trade – but not the institution – within the United Provinces. However, a
lucrative illegal slave trade thrived along the border with Brazil. The nature of the border, long
and largely unregulated, made the area ideal for smuggling slaves into Argentina from Brazil,
where slavery remained wholly legal. Through the Anglo-Argentine Treaty of 1825, Argentina
and Brazil agreed to work together in suppressing the trade. While both states worked together to
curb the illegal slave trade across their shared frontier, it did not cease entirely. The remote border
region made even a concerted effort to stop slavers very difficult.61
While the institution of slavery survived, there were steps taken by the revolutionary
government to curtail it. Employing the same liberal and humanitarian rhetoric espoused in other
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realms of governance, the triumvirate took steps to limit slavery. In 1813, the revolutionary
government issued a series of decrees to achieve this. The first, dated 2 February, established the
libertad de vientres (freedom by birth), which applied to all slaves born on or after 31 January of
that year. A similar decree was issued, two days later, declaring all those slaves entering the United
Provinces from that date to be free.
A third decree, dated 6 March, provided for the education and integration of former slaves
into society. In reality, however, this decree limited the freedom of former slaves rather than paving
the way for expanded freedom. All those children born free to slaves were to remain in the master’s
household until the age of twenty. For their first fifteen years of service, no compensation was to
be paid to them. During their final five years, a meager one peso per month was their reward for
service. To the revolutionary government these laws were enlightened and progressive.
Considering contemporary laws regarding limitations on slavery, such a belief was not entirely
inappropriate. Still, discontent among slaves and free-born blacks was palpable, a manifestation
of the reality of the reforms. In response, the Gazeta de Buenos Aires wrote that they “should not
complain if some continue to still live in oppressed conditions” because as the Spaniards had “once
made you slaves they have deprived you perhaps forever of being free.”62 It seems that those
already endowed with their freedom by birth did not believe it to be achievable through decree
alone, they held the position that freedom came of birth and not by law of man.
Slavery in Argentina was not as intensive as in some other areas of Latin America, where
the plantation system had expanded rapidly. Instead the typical slave in the Rio de la Plata was
either a domestic servant for an estanciero or other wealthy individual, or a worker in the cattle
industry that Argentina had come to embrace. In this latter regard, the master – much like a master
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of the typical plantation system – expected a return on his investment in the slave. Many of these
landed elites who held slaves and wished to hold on to them for the time being were also figures
in the Federalist movement. Many of the estancieros who supported Rosas held slaves. Perhaps of
even more importance, even those who were not great landowners did as well. Rosas’ urban allies
owned many slaves, servants to run their homes in the city. This helps to explain, despite antislavery rhetoric and limited actions taken against the institution, why slavery persisted in
Argentina. Elite interests prevented definitive resolution of the issue of slavery in Argentina.
In 1822, the population of Buenos Aires was 55,416. Of that, 13,685, or 24.7%, were black
or mulatto. Around 60% of all blacks and 30% of mulattos were slaves. Compare these figures to
a decade prior, at the end of colonial rule when actions taken against slavery began: 29.3% of the
population, some 11,837 people, in Buenos Aires were black or mulatto and roughly 77% of blacks
were enslaved.63 While the percentage of the enslaved population decreased, the actual number of
slaves remained essentially unchanged in the city of Buenos Aires.
The elites of Argentina seemed content to allow slavery to continue, acting only to reduce
the scale at which it existed. Through this approach, slavery would never terminate abruptly in
Argentina. Elites preferred to keep slavery alive as long as possible to benefit their position. The
prevailing sentiment seemed to be that Argentina must wait for slavery to wither and die on the
vine when elite interests no longer benefited heavily from the institution. Rosas’ rule confirmed
this sentiment. No further significant changes to the status of slavery were introduced. Not until
Rosas was forced to flee Argentina in exile was slavery legally abolished. In 1851, Rosas’ ally
Justo José de Urquiza grew discontent with Rosas’ rule. Rosas refused to end his dominance in
Argentina in favor of policies more akin to those touted by the Unitarians that he had expelled
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from Argentina. Chiefly, pressure was mounting on his regime to adopt a constitution that would
adopt institutions to safeguard the political process and end hegemonic rule. France and Great
Britain had initiated a blockade of Argentina to force Rosas to end his opposition to the reform.
Urquiza, partially motivated by potential increased economic autonomy to be gained for his
province in the event of Rosas’ downfall, allied himself with Brazil to oust Rosas in 1852. 64 A
significant wave of anti-rosismo followed and allowed for the constitution of 1853 to be drafted.
It expressly prohibited slavery in the whole of Argentina.65
In terms of social reform, across the board, Rosas’ Caudillismo maintained much of the
rhetoric of the Unitarian political movement but abandoned any attempt at meaningful reform.
Instead, in terms slavery, the status quo was maintained for the purpose of preserving elite
interests, in particular those of Rosas’ estanciero allies. Meanwhile, gaucho culture had been
fundamentally changed to favor the estancieros. Indigenous peoples were eliminated, displaced to
the peripheries of the Argentine state, and had their land confiscated and placed into the hands of
the estancieros.
The impact of the Caudillismo on the social and economic landscape of Argentina was
undeniably important in shaping the development of the Argentine state. The dominance of the
landed elite was solidified under the rule of Rosas as their control of new lands was facilitated
through the power structures employed by the caudillos. Gaucho subculture was undermined and
those who had once enjoyed the freedom of individualism were subsumed into the estancia. The
interests of the landed elite and their close relationship to Rosas ensured that slavery remained
intact and that indigenous populations were expelled from valuable lands.
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Caudillos and Patron-Client Networks
I served them with notorious favoritism in everything the asked for and needed.
The lands they have, they received through me. – Juan Manuel de Rosas66

For the caudillos, the establishment of elaborate patron-client networks was paramount for
both achieving and maintaining power in a system of competing personalities, jockeying for the
best possible position that they could achieve. Rosas was second to none in utilizing clientelism to
achieve his aims.
Land was of supreme value for those hoping to establish a superior position within the
system. Not only did land provide an economic base from which to fund military exploits and build
personal wealth, but it also gave the landowning patrons access to a personal reserve of men in the
form of the peons who worked for them. However, one’s rank among landowners did not translate
directly to one’s positon within the patron-client network. Rosas himself occupied tenth place out
of the seventeen largest landowners – those owning more than 300,000 acres – with some 400,000
acres.67 But his peonaje, allied caudillos and estancieros, and militia were better armed and under
far firmer control than those of any rival caudillo.68
Nepotism also favored Rosas. His large and wealthy family placed him in a superior
position to utilize such connections. The Anchorena family, the single largest landholders in
Argentina with an impressive collection of estancias exceeding 2,300,000 acres and some
1,000,000 acres in Buenos Aires province alone, were Rosas’ cousins and loyal members of his
network during his tenure.69 Felipe Arana – Minister of Foreign Affairs – was distantly related and
Lucio Mansilla, military leader and governor of the Chaco province, was his brother-in-law.
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Rosas’ brothers Gervasio and Prudencio also played key roles as valuable landowners.70 Family
provided the foundation for Rosas to form a strong base on which to build, but the blood of the
covenant is thicker than the water of the womb, and Rosas needed to create a network that reached
beyond his familial ties.
Rosas’ reputation as a military leader and skilled gaucho during his youth attracted many
to his camp. The patron imposed his authority not simply through his wealth but also his reputation.
He enjoyed the reputation of being as resourceful a gaucho as his peons.71 This was not only to
gain the respect of his peons but also to prove his masculine qualities, showing that he was not
simply a member of some out-of-touch landed class but a gaucho at his core. Gaucho subculture
developed indifferent to both civil law and church authority. Gauchos partook in masculine
activities such as fighting, gambling, and horseback riding. Such physical activities were part of a
pageantry of masculinity. Skilled bodily activity was a prime indicator of masculinity and
inhabited a sphere of behavior that was seen as exclusively masculine.72 Gauchos placed value on
these activities and caudillos were well regarded for their participation in them. Building a
masculine image at the center of a cult of personality enabled Rosas to more easily build his client
network. This, combined with his superior allies and control over the land grants given out during
the early years of the Argentine state, placed him at the top. Masculinity is most often derived from
the use of the male body. Traditionally, masculinity was thought to be an inherent trait to males
and based upon the natural disposition of their sex. In such an understanding of masculinity, those
activities that are considered rough to the body are considered masculine – as females were
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considered too fragile to participate in them. As such, physical activities such as horseback riding
or fighting were considered masculine.73
The patron benefited greatly from the labor, loyalty, and service provided by his peonaje,
but the system was not one-way. The peon received, in exchange for surrendering many of his
freedoms, the security of the patron and a life provided for him. Patrons worked to keep their peons
safe from marauders, recruiting sergeants, and the militias of rival caudillos. In addition, the patron
developed local resources to benefit both patron and client alike. Not all peons joined willingly,
however. As a reminder, labor and vagrancy laws established in the interest of the landed elite
were designed to drive potential peons into the estancias – in particular vagabond gauchos. The
gauchos surrendered their freedoms as part of a social contract with the patron, becoming the
property of the patron and his estancia. Such a lifestyle was alien to the gauchos. However, to
them the estate represented sanctuary from the dangers of the countryside. Just as it was a safe
haven, it was also a prison to the wandering spirit of the gaucho.74
At the height of Rosas’ power, Argentina was essentially the physical domain of Rosas’
patron-client network, a loose arrangement of estancias that was unified by the patronage of Rosas
the supreme proprietor. Arrangements formed between clients and their patrons sought the
protection of even greater individuals. This network lead to Rosas at its center, residing in his own
caudillo state of Buenos Aires. Rosas occupied the heights of power and patronage in Argentina
and imposed his will upon the state through reward and punishment.
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Masculinity and the Caudillo
In the Argentine Provinces one needs neither riches nor talent and education, nor other
antecedents but valor and audacity… to move and take control of the destinies of the country.
Many have begun… apprenticing themselves in rebellions that they have led with
more or less success, but always with audacity and with daring. 75

At first glance the socio-cultural phenomenon of machismo76 in Latin America may seem
unique to the region. However, there are similarities to be drawn between machismo and other
patriarchal models of masculinity that were cotemporaneous with it. Each shared common basic
principles: a strong sense of masculinity and dominance over the feminine were at the heart of
these systems. Nevertheless, masculinity in Latin America, as around the western world, was a
very important cultural phenomenon. In terms of Caudillismo in Argentina, masculinity served an
important role. The caudillo utilized the importance of masculinity to influence those around him.
Each constructed his own cult of personality to gain the respect, admiration, and loyalty of his
subjects.
In Latin American, as commonly believed elsewhere during the nineteenth century, men
and women were considered different from each other, both physically and psychologically. These
differences were determined to be inherent to the biology of the two sexes.77 Each sex inhabited
its own sphere. While these masculine and feminine spheres of activity may have shared roles
between them, there were distinct images associated with each. Women were represented by the
heart and emotions, and their natural role was as homemaker and mother. On the other hand, men
were portrayed as the bearers of physical strength, rationality, and authority.78 Authority was built
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into the role of men in society. Such characteristics are not unique to one culture’s conception of
gender and roles. The cultures of the Western world, in particular, share these basic tenants.
According to Breines, Connell, and Edie’s conceptualization of the sex-role theory of
gender, boys develop their masculine traits and worldviews through socialization. They learn early
on from their interactions in family life and from social cues and interactions later in life. In order
to feel as though they belong, they will attempt to emulate the social stereotypes of manliness that
they are expected to embrace. Gender involves large-scale socio-cultural elements shaping the
identity of those people affected by them.79 In early nineteenth-century Argentina, two important
socio-cultural factors that shaped the image of masculinity, the gaucho subculture and military
tradition.
Masculinity in Latin America focused on honor and chivalric principles – in line with the
way in which power was accumulated by caudillos through patron-client networks. Both
clientelism and masculinity in Latin America shared traits with feudal social and cultural
phenomena. While obsession with honor and chivalry is found ubiquitously in all forms of western
masculinity, there are regional differences in what the various forms of masculinity place the
greatest emphasis on. In contrast to Latin American models, southern United States masculinity
focused much more heavily on the rhetoric of paternalism in regards to slave ownership and in the
interaction with lesser landowners than in the estancias.80 While Europe maintained a masculinity
rooted in military tradition, similar to that seen in Latin America, the prestige and power gained
through it was not utilized in the same manner. Through military service caudillos gained the same
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basic qualities as their European counterparts. However, they utilized their newfound prestige and
authority to build elaborate power networks as a means of controlling the process of state
formation. Military service was an incredibly important phenomenon not only for a caudillo to
gather power but also to build a masculine image through victory and prowess on the battlefield.
The military was not the only avenue to create such a masculine image. As mentioned
before, the prowess that Rosas displayed in his early adulthood as a skilled gaucho on his family’s
estancia gave him clout among his peonaje – augmenting his already advantageous social status
and familial ties with prestige and a well-developed masculine image. The same was true for
Facundo Quiroga. The epithet of el tigre de los llanos stuck with him throughout his career. Despite
a lackluster early military career, Facundo Quiroga quickly sprang into action when the moment
presented itself and used his position in local business to lead the way in his province’s fight
against the Unitarian movement.
The gaucho was the primary cultural symbol of masculinity for Argentina. He represented
the archetypal male. Roaming the pampas,81 free of any commitment or attachments to society, he
employed his masculine traits every day to survive. Ironically, while the caudillos sought to
emulate the gauchos and their masculine image to gain their favor, they also sought to end their
subculture. The gaucho was purged of his independence on the estancia, leaving the gaucho
subculture vulnerable. In the end, while the gaucho ceased to exist as a significant entity in
Argentine culture, his image, a trope, was coopted and reconstructed in romantic literatures touting
epic masculine figures.82
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While the social ranking of the caudillos mattered greatly in determining their success, it
did not determine all. Masculinity also played a role in the making of caudillos. It both
complimented the authority of those who had preceded their roles as caudillos as members of the
landed elite and gave opportunity to those of lower standing to carve out a place for themselves.
Those who were member of the landed elite by jus sanguinis, or even those who had managed to
climb the ranks to join them, were far more likely to be caudillos. They were also more likely to
be in greater positions of power within the network of clients beneath greater patrons.
However, occupation of a position within the landed elite was not requisite to achieving
the status of caudillo. Through personal valor and skill an infinitesimal few of the most
disadvantaged men managed to rise through the ranks and claim their positions as regional
caudillos. Three caudillos in particular – Indalecio Nieto, Carmen Guevara, and Aurelio Zalazar –
began their careers as peons, working on the estancias. Even more surprising, two of the men were
illiterate.83 Despite their disadvantages they managed, through display of prowess as gaucho
peons, to garner and mobilize prestige, and the support that came with it, to seize opportunities of
power. This was far from the average experience of the typical peon. Participation in military
exploits was the surest way to establish a masculine image and prove oneself as a capable leader.
However, the militias where peons served were rigidly incorporated into the estancias. The
estanciero was commander, the overseer was officer, and the peon occupied the role of the
soldier.84 In this way the rigidity of social structures were enforced under the rule of the caudillos,
limiting opportunities for social and economic advancement.
The key to the clientelism employed by the caudillo political organization was the patron.
Rosas occupied the heights of clientelism in Argentina during his tenure. His role as the supreme

83
84

de la Fuente, Children of Facundo, 83.
Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 202.

Bos 36

patron exhibited elements of paternalism. This was not in regard to care for the gaucho peons
under the command of Rosas’ lesser caudillos of the estancias, but instead in his relations with
said estancieros. There was an element of paternalism, however, in the relation of the estanciero
and his peonaje. As mentioned before, the patron would provide for his peonaje, but this
relationship was not of mutual interest or benefit. The estancieros and caudillos both masqueraded
as a benevolent patrons, serving their subordinates and claiming to serve in their best interests.85
Loyalty of an estanciero was rewarded by Rosas. In exchange for submitting themselves
before the superior figure of Rosas, the estancieros and their peons received land titles and
positions in government, feeding Rosas’ image as a generous leader to his subjects. An even more
crucial aspect than the role of rewards was how they were acquired prior to disbursement.
As discussed earlier, the Desert Campaign was used by Rosas as a means to unlock vast
tracts of land. However, it served a double purpose. By leading the overall campaign himself Rosas
boosted his military credentials and his masculine image amongst those who followed him –
estanciero and gaucho peon alike. Here can be seen the close link between military prowess and
the masculine image of the ruler. Military exploits were the chief means of building up such an
image and proved especially worthwhile as wars opened new lands and filled the coffers of
caudillos as they participated in the looting of conquered peoples and land.
Patriarchal rule emerged during the transition from colony to state. Leaders of the early
Argentine state assumed the role of benevolent father, demanding the obedience and respect of the
very provincial residents they labeled as barbaric in culture. The family was recognized by many
political figures as a means to hold the state together. The great families and their patriarchs would
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bind the state together with their authority and power. Politicians sought to enhance the powers of
these patriarchs in nearly all activity within the Argentine state.86
The patron-client networks and patriarchal rule employed by the caudillos and the early
political leaders of the Argentine state share much with the “hierarchy and hegemony” model of
masculinity. In this system, various masculinities exist with one that dominates over the others. In
the case of Argentina, this would be machismo and the emulation of the gaucho masculine image.
There is a strong relation between the various masculinities as they are structured in a hierarchy,
with the dominant masculinity at the center.87 This arrangement is certainly analogous to the
relation of Rosas and his subjects. The implications of these arrangements are that large numbers
of men within the society have divided, tense, or adversarial attitudes toward the hegemonic
masculinity figure. On the other end of the hierarchy’s spectrum, those occupying the heights have
little motivation to enact change as they wish to maintain their power.88
The masculine image associated with a caudillo was an essential aspect of rule. This image
gave the caudillo authority amongst the gaucho peons, who valued such traits. The patron
commanded the loyalty and respect of his peonaje, as well as from the lesser caudillos. Therefore,
the expansion of a caudillo’s power network and his position amongst the regional caudillos relied
heavily upon the masculine image that he constructed around himself.
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With the domination of Buenos Aires and provincial Argentina under Rosas for a period
of 23 years, caudillismo profoundly impacted the trajectory and policies of the early Argentine
state. Under the direction of Rosas, land was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the elite
estancieros. These elites found a faithful ally in Rosas. He aided in the taming of the gauchos,
tying them to the estancia and punishing them for their nomadic culture. New lands were opened
through aggressive expansion and indigenous peoples were killed or displaced to the peripheries
of Argentine settlement. In order to serve the estancieros and the porteño elites, reforms to the
institution of slavery were halted. Even with the end of Rosas’ rule in 1852, regional caudillos
continued to exert influence in their respective spaces and continued to shape the development of
Argentina’s various provinces. The effects of Rosas and these lesser caudillos on the economic
and social characteristics of Argentina during the early formation of the state were profound. They
established the foundations of development and set the trajectory of many social and economic
trends – including the ever greater concentration of wealth in the hands of the estancieros and
metropolitan elites and the redefinition of the cultural landscape of Argentina.
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